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The Common Theoretical Source or Deterministic and Voluntaristic 
Approaches: Conceptions of the Mechanical Unity of Interests
In the decade following the liberation of Hungary in 1945, the image of 
workers' actions was imbued with the idea that the primary and final aim 
of working-class resistance within capitalism is the overthrow of the 
capitalist social system. With the elimination of capitalist ownership, 
there is no longer any basis for workers’ resistance to representatives of 
the company or the state. The elimination of private ownership of the 
means of production liberates social relations from the all-pervasive and 
irreconcilable antagonism between capital and labour.
A significant role in this simplified analysis of workers’ behaviour is 
played by the well-known concept of the working class as either a ‘class in 
itself ora ‘class for itself. In essence, the ‘working class in itself is brought 
into existence by the objective economic relations of capitalism, whereas 
the ‘working class for itself is the subjectively mature working class which 
consciously recognizes its own position, is aware of its own historical 
mission, and is prepared to undertake collective actions and effect the 
overthrow of capitalist society. In this approach, the ‘non-conscious’, 
subjectively immature working class is necessarily transformed into a 
class ‘for itself, whose members are the class-conscious workers. The 
transformation is only a question of time, as the maturation of the 
objective economic conditions inevitably intensifies the conflict between 
capital and labour. The working class comes to realize its subordinate 
position, and recognizes that this subordination can be changed only 
through organized collective struggle.
A concomitant to this theory is the idea that the development of 
working-class consciousness can be substantially accelerated by political 
organizations representing the workers’ interests: a class-conscious 
working class will result from the activity of the political parties and trade 
unions of the working class.1
The dichotomous categories illustrating working-class action, however, 
have only limited application for changes within the capitalist mode of 
production. For example, they are not useful for understanding the 
success of economic and political reforms in maintaining the continuity, 
and staving off the collapse, of a given capitalist society. Many of Marx’s 
adherents have followed Marx in neglecting the analysis of interest and 
power conflicts on the local and individual levels. Thus, discussion of 
those conflicts that are ‘under normal circumstances manifestations of
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class struggle’ is particularly abstract -  from the peculiarities not only of 
local class struggles but also of different capitalist countries.2
Parallel to the emergence of socialist property relations in Hungary 
there appeared views of politics and economic management that deduced 
workers ’ orientations towards work and towards the enterprise directly 
from certain definite ‘objective conditions’. These views emphasized 
almost exclusively the undeniably enormous changes that had taken place 
in property relations. However, they took no account of the work 
processes of the nationalized factories, of their organizational relations, 
or of the forms and content of the evolving social connections. In the 
simplified, romantic image of socialist development, they overlooked the 
fact that the overthrow of capitalist property relations did not include the 
overthrow of the relations of division and specialization of labour.3 
Furthermore:
If the [fragmented and hierarchical] character of the work does not 
make it possible for workers to survey the production process then 
their control of property cannot prevail completely. Although by 
activity outside the work process some forms of indirect rule can be 
achieved, such a relation to property is still not the same as that of the 
persons governing the production process.*
These analyses also forgot that workers’ behaviour within production is 
influenced by social connections and the alternatives of action outside the 
work proccss. They paid minimal attention, for example, to the formation 
of relations between the character of production practices and the ‘rcpro- 
ductional conditions* of the manpower participating in it, and to the 
effects produced by these conditions on work-place behaviour.
In the analytical scheme outlined above, the individual or collective 
conduct of workers can be understood only on the basis of the common 
interests characteristic of the entire working class, which develop almost 
automatically with the overthrow of capitalist property relations.
On the level of macro-structural analysis, the principal particularity of 
the period was that the political sphere failed to acknowledge the relative 
autonomy of the processes taking place in the economy. Therefore it 
determined that social mechanisms mediating between the political and 
the economic system were unnecessary. But according to this view, 
behaviour in the work process was guided not by the development of 
particular interests and the ability to realize them, but by political will, 
‘knowing all, seeing all and being omnipotent’.5
Thus, the unity of action necessary to realize production aims can be 
simply deduced from property relations freed from exploitation, and from 
the resultant (supposed) collective interest Conflicts of interest are not to 
be found in this conception, which denies the existence both of differences 
of interests and of inequality in the possibility of acting on those interests. 
There is recognition of such differences only in terms of the role played 
by individual consciousness in the perception of social and economic 
conditions. Such outward forms of workers’ behaviour as, for example,
WORKERS’ BEHAVIOUR AND INTERESTS IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY 181
the level of work performance have been explained in this way. Those who 
perfomt the best arc those workers possessing the most developed 
consciousness, that is those who see their own interests, based on socialist 
property relations, as identical to the interests of society as a whole. Weak 
work performance comes from ‘backward’ workers, of ‘undeveloped 
consciousness’, among whom there is inadequate motivation.
In the thinking and practice of the decade following the liberation of 
1945, the views interpreting workers’ behaviour are inseparable from the 
conception declaring the mechanical unity of interests in society. The 
thesis of the mechanical unity of interests can be summarized as follows. 
As a consequence of the replacement of capitalist property relations by 
socialist (state-owned) property relations, the conflictual class relations 
of capitalist society, based on the contradiction between socialized forces 
of production and private appropriation of surplus, come to an end and 
the unity of interests and, consequently, of action come into being. On the 
basis of this view, the policy-making process of the period directly 
following liberation dealt with the mentality of the workers in connection 
with production and distribution with increased expectation and con­
fidence. M&y&s Rikosi, for instance, appreciated the inarguably great 
work performance during reconstruction:
Most of the factories remained without a director after the liberation 
and often without leading engineers. It was the workers who 
restored these factories and put them into operation. Meanwhile 
they made great sacrifices, sacrifices which will doubtless constitute 
the most brilliant pages of the Hungarian workers’ movement. They 
did not see a director for weeks or even months and this led them to 
believe that they could run the factories without capitalists too. The 
young Hungarian democracy assured far-reaching rights ... to the 
workers ... in the direction of the plant.6
In this quotation the deterministic behaviour is based on the notion of a 
self-conscious working class, a class' for itself’; it is presumed that after the 
elimination of capitalist ownership of the means of production the relation 
of workers to the factory and to work itself is radically transformed within 
weeks or months. Such an image of workers is not confined to Hungary. In 
the world of work -  as well as in other activity areas of society -  images of 
social harmony and conflict-free societies dominate the foreign practice of 
building socialism as well. Plenty of examples are to be found in Soviet 
novels dealing with production. The plot of many of these unfolds in the 
‘conflict-free’ world of some enterprise, roughly according to the follow­
ing scheme:
In the novel everything is reflected: the activity of the engineers and 
technicians as well as that of the factory organizations, the workers 
on top, their wives and fiancfes, the learning, the culture group, the 
traditional old non-party man, who has already been working in this 
factory for fifty years and offers a miraculously wise opinion about all
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phenomena of life. Somebody discovers something, somebody is 
mistaken in something (not for long), somebody is in love with 
somebody (not too ardently). They describe two meetings in which 
the entire collective participates; the red table cloth is mentioned 
along with the carafe on tiie table of the chairman. The factory 
worries about the fulfilment of the plan; the author explains to his 
readers what is undermining the fulfilment of the difficult plan; by 
the end of the novel through the help of the heroes the difficulties will 
have been overcome, the plan will have been fulfilled early, the 
workers on top are rewarded, the anti-hero will be detected by the 
collective.7
However, it soon emerges that in the world of work, just as in other 
fields of society, there exist forms of behaviour inconsistent with the 
officially declared interest of the whole society. But, since objective 
interest contradictions may not exist in socialist society or socialist enter­
prises, workers’ behaviour differing from the societal or enterprise aims is 
explainable only by the presence of the ‘enemy’ or by ‘backward con­
sciousness’ -  that is, by factors external to the functioning of the social 
system.
According to the interpretations emphasizing the role of conscious­
ness, the thinking of one group of workers falls behind the development of 
socialist social conditions: these workers are unable to comprehend, for 
example, what is correct as regards performance and wages. A significant 
fraction of these workers are ‘loafers’ and those who restrict their output. 
These ‘backward’ workers undermine the efforts of the conscious, dis­
ciplined workers, who
... fiercely and spontaneously take measures against the undis­
ciplined ones. They do this not only because they also suffer as the 
consequence of the lack of discipline, but because they comprehend 
that the relaxation of labour discipline hinders the entire project of 
socialist construction, the development of the country. The con­
scious workers also leam that such undisciplined workers, as a 
means of self-justification, are always dissatisfied, grumbling, 
blustering, and finding fault, and thus become the spokesmen of the 
enemy.®
These oppositional and socially undesirable forms of behaviour, often 
manifesting themselves in connection with performance requirements, 
occur primarily among workers of low consciousness. Behind the 
apparent moralizing condemnation of work-place behaviour, a changed 
conception of the role of the working class can be discovered. No longer is 
there reference to the working class ‘for itself, but more and more a 
conception of the working class ‘in itself can be identified in the inter­
pretation of workers’ behaviour. Furthermore, such a conception 
provides a sort of political programme based on the view that one part of 
the working class is still subjectively immature and therefore unaware of
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its historic mission. Accordingly, wide educational work should be done 
in order to make these workers ‘conscious’.
The other source of undesirable behaviour is to be found in the hostile 
environment outside the socialist system. The lack of work discipline, the 
poor quality of work or the systematic restriction of output is attributed to 
the disruptive activity of imperialist agents. EmfJ GerO ascribed the 
inflation of workers’ wages in the 1950s to the action of the enemy:
... in the increase of wages to such an extent no small part was played 
by the fact that while we were busy with other questions, the enemy 
could exploit this situation and took advantage of the fact that in 
many of the workers both the consciousness and the discipline were 
yet weak; the enemy succeeded in opening a new front against the 
democracy, namely the front of the mass manipulation of wages and 
norms.9
These simple and distorted pictures of the response to work norms are 
part of that social policy that did not want to deal with the actual 
motivation and possibilities of work-place behaviour but considered it 
sufficient to handle the problems in a moralizing and administrative way. 
Failure to examine this view excessively exaggerated and thereby made a 
fetish of the influence of capitalism, while questioning the autonomous 
social force and dynamism of labour. Without doubt, the sharp ideo­
logical struggle between the two types of social system was partly 
responsible. During the cold war, especially, the ideologists of capitalist 
industrial relations tended to attribute their internal troubles to external 
communist agitation. Thus, American journalists attributed strikes to the 
activity of communist-minded trade union stewards. The exclusion of 
other explanations for strikes had an unmistakable political and ideo­
logical purpose: it created an opportunity for campaigns against pro­
gressive and active trade union shop stewards and for the generation of 
anti-communist hysteria.10 The communist members of the American 
trade union movement protested against these interpretations, but their 
intervention remained ineffective.
The responses to workers’ action were not exhausted by moralizing 
explanations. A wide arsenal of means was applied to incite desired forms 
of behaviour and to punish undesired ones. At the level of the enterprise, 
management strove to establish harmony between individual goals and 
those of the whole nation by means of pecuniary incentives and various 
forms of consciousness-raising.
If ‘problematic behaviour’ -  for example, restriction of output or 
frequent absence from work -  is explained as the product of the under­
development of consciousness relative to our social relations, then we 
have to select corresponding methods of getting over the lag. Thus, piece- 
rates became the decisive form of socialist wage in these years.
In the years immediately following liberation, scarcely more than one- 
third of the workers engaged in industry were paid by piece-rates.11 
National and foreign investigations into the relation of work performance
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to wages do not warrant expectations of heightened efficiency as a result of 
the piece-rate system. The fact-finding investigation of the International 
Labour Organization, already several decades old, concluded that:
The positive effect of the piece-rate system waging or in general of 
the pecuniary incentives on work performance succeeds through the 
modernization of the methods of work performance. At the same 
time, one can also achieve results of such a character of the work 
organization independently of alterations in the wage system.12
National as well as foreign experiences repeatedly call attention to the 
negative social and economic effects of the piece-rate system.13 In spite of 
this, the piece-rate system has invariably kept its leading position among 
wage forms. According to the statistical assessment of employees in state- 
owned industry, for example, even today more than half of those working 
on machines and more than 90 per cent of workers employed on assembly 
lines labour under piece-rate systems.14
In addition to pecuniary incentives the authorities applied a wide range 
of consciousness-raising techniques. Their aim was, as noted above, to 
raise the consciousness of the workers of work collectives to the level at 
which their own ambitions become one with the interests of society. Not 
only professional propagandists but agit-propagandists chosen from 
higher levels of workers also dealt with the formation of consciousness.
An account of the role of the agitator-worker, and his methods of 
consciousness-raising, is given as follows:
It is a very common phenomenon for our agitators generally to make 
a comparison between the former life of the workers, the life of the 
workers in the capitalist countries and our present situation. In 
the Kispest Textile Factory (Kistext) woman comrade Mrs Jozsef 
Nemeth, a Stakhanovite agit-propagandist, talked with Miss 
Erzsebet Vali on the fulfilment of the plan. In the course of the talk 
she said, approximately, 'What you have pledged is that you have to 
perform since the plan is the law. By this you defend your fatherland, 
the people’s democracy and peace. Our economic situation is 
steadily improving. You can see that even rationing has come to an 
end. All this is the latest success of our party, government and 
working people. You can also see that the meat ration is 80 grammes 
a week in England, the transport fares have been raised by 25 per 
cent, while we steadily grow firm and develop.15
The political leadership of this period applied strong measures when 
they thought that undesirable work-place behaviour was the work of 
‘outside’ enemies. When restriction of output, ‘manipulation of the 
norms’, increases in the percentage of waste or degeneration of work 
discipline was diagnosed as the result of instigation by an imperialist 
agent, the instigator was arrested or interned or, in less serious cases, 
dismissed.16
Neither by the different systems of piece-rates nor by ideological and
WORKERS’ BEHAVIOUR AND INTERESTS IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY 185
administrative measures did social policy makers succeed in persuading 
significant numbers of workers to accept the ‘interests of the whole 
society’, which were interpreted within the enterprise as woiking con­
ditions resulting in maximum performance. It turned out that under 
socialism, as in every complex and rapidly changing society, the realization 
of aims and strivings expressing a requirement of development is possible 
only through the recognition and coordination of the interests of ail social 
strata, groups and individuals taking part in that realization.
However, the harmonization of interests is a process charged with 
social and psychological conflicts. For example, the compromise of 
interests around the question of work performance and distribution 
affects the individual or collective interests of participants unevenly in 
time and space. In the work process mutual understanding emerges or 
disappears not at all automatically but rather through a succession of 
conflicts. Interest structures condition workers’ behaviour and the 
outcome of conflicts; compared with this the relative backwardness of the 
individual or collective consciousness is of secondary significance.
Social Policy-Making for Differentiated Interests: A Multidimensional 
Conception of Interests
It was asserted above that the structural and hierarchical relations of the 
social division of labour cannot be ‘overthrown’ through revolution, and 
that therefore the diversity of interests and action possibilities must be 
taken into consideration. The system of political and economic policy can 
only moderate and limit the intensity and effect of the interest differences 
characteristic of certain periods of social development and the social 
capacities and opportunities affecting their realization. The incentive 
methods applied to influence the individual or collective behaviour 
of workers become factors of development only if they take into con­
sideration actual interest and action relations.
Since the early 1960s, the concept of differentiated interests has played 
a key role in the cognition and influence within national social policy of the 
real and structural roots of workers’ behaviour. Furthermore, from the 
beginning of the 1970s the image of a living, changing socialism deriving its 
evolutionary dynamism from interest conflicts, interwoven with objective 
interest relations, also appears in party documents.17 The most general 
characteristics of socialism ‘do not differ from capitalism in that there are 
no interest conflicts [in socialism] but do differ in that the class basis of the 
structural conflicts has come to an end’.18
The differentiation of processes in work organization can be explained 
on the one hand by the social division of labour within the enterprise, and 
on the other hand by the continuous changes taking place in the various 
components of the work process. Thus, it is easy to see that the objective 
social and economic factors defining the fundamental motives of workers’ 
actions are inseparable from subjective factors -  consciousness -  and 
together they establish a multitude of systems of motives and incentives.
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The identification of different interests attempted to make this multitude 
manageable.
In the politics and social policy-making of the late 1960s the three- 
dimensional conception of interest make its appearance.
According to this we can speak of three types and levels of interests: 
those of the whole society, of groups and of individuals. The different 
types form a hierarchical system of relations. In the course of conflicts of 
interest, individual interests are subordinated to group interests, as the 
latter are to the interests of the whole society. If there arise tensions 
among the different types of interests, the higher interests always take 
precedence over the lower ones.19 The priority of the higher interests is 
guaranteed by the various organizations involved, by the institutions of 
social policy and by social movements. The threefold notion of interest or, 
as it is often called, the interest triad -  was a significant development over 
the previous conception postulating and accepting only a single interest. 
The recognition of the existence of particular interests can also be 
considered an important conceptual part of the basis of the new economic 
reforms.
Sociological research of the 1970s called attention to the weak or at least 
disputable points of the conception of the interest triad. The general 
experience of sociological investigations dealing with worker behaviour is 
that the structure of work-place interests is manifold and differentiated so 
that the ‘interest of the whole society: group interest: individual interest’ 
dimensions capture only a fraction of the real conflict of interest.
An understanding of our social and economic development requires 
the elaboration of a multidimensional notion of interests suitable for 
the description and comprehension of contradictory interests among 
different groups of workers at local as well as regional level. Such an 
elaboration does not serve immediate demands alone, as conflicting 
interests cannot be eliminated in the long run either. The tensions among 
the interests of the whole society as well as among partial interests, 
differing in form and intensity, remain long-lasting. Mutual agreements 
for easing them can be only temporary.21
Investigations into such well-known forms of work-place behaviour 
as performance, discipline, or the development of workers’ partici­
pation have drawn attention to other important components of human 
behaviour besides relations among interests. The realization of individual 
and collective interests can be promoted or hindered by social attach­
ments evolving at the work-place. The role of friendship in the satisfaction 
of individual interests is well reflected in the following remarks:
Here everyone is a friend and relies on it. So do I! Because if I need 
something I go to my mate, as no one does favours for anyone but 
his mates. And when my mate comes to me he gets priority over 
anyone else, even if what someone else wants is more important or 
more urgent [for the plant]. I have to think of who I’ll go to next.22
According to Hungarian and foreign research into workers’ behaviour,
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it is not possible to predict actual behaviour even through the most 
differentiated understanding of motives, taking into consideration behav­
iour motives as well as interests. This is because organizational relations 
do not ensure uniform conditions for the realization of perceived 
interests.
In the centre of human action -  namely, in the work process -  the 
possibilities for the acquisition of knowledge and the development 
of interests proceed very unevenly. The disproportion between the 
acquisition and the use of knowledge -  general professional or specific to 
the work process -  necessary for participation in any productive activity is 
the source of the differentiation of the capacity to realize interests. On the 
basis o f analysis o f interest relations themselves we may say only a little 
about the likelihood o f the realization o f interests. The ‘price’ of the 
compromise between interests can be determined and influenced only 
through knowledge of the capacities of the participants.
Without this one cannot predict the chances of the formation of an 
interest group. In conflicts arising among workers and management it is by 
no means easy to mobilize a collective force for the immediate realization 
of interests. Only in special -  one might say historical -  situations do those 
facing identical deprivations resolve their problems through common 
action. Collective action directed towards the elimination of deprivation, 
evaluated in an identical manner by different participants, is the result of a 
combination of numerous structural factors. Even supposing the auto­
matic organization of interest groups, it is by no means inevitable that the 
participants in the work process, for example managers and staff, will 
recognize those forms of action through which their interests could 
most effectively be realized. Such a ‘supra-rational’ conception of 
organizational behaviour bears a close relationship to the pluralist notion 
of power as lying in the continuous presence and automatic development 
of interest groups -  namely, the so-called ‘pressure group’.23 However, 
research into the practice of industrial relations has not found an auto­
matic development of interest groups.24
The different combinations of the material elements of the work 
process -  the object of work and the instruments of work -  offer various 
action possibilities for the subjective performer. In consequence of 
the disparities in their action possibilities, workers possess diverse 
opportunities, both as individuals and as collectives, to discover tech­
niques of work performance and their usefulness for the realization of 
interests. In their work performance, it is not only the professional- 
technical knowledge of the workers that increases: simultaneously, the 
woikers aquire a knowledge of the materials and tools and the operation 
of the machines. They ‘leam’ how to eam the most with the least effort -  
that is, they ‘learn’ the amount of the desired and attainable wage. In this 
learning process, the worker gets to know not only himself but his 
companions as well. Depending on the peculiarities of the construction 
and operation of the work organization, he acquires a ‘social knowledge’ 
of diversified content and level far beyond the professional-technical
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knowledge. The disparities of the social experience mastered in this way 
lead to significant differences in the capacity to realize worker interests.
NOTES
Csaba Mak6 is Director of the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences.
1. This conception of behaviour also influences Hungarian social scientific and political 
thought. This is confirmed by the discussions of the working class that were organized 
by the editorial committee of the Tdrsadalmi Szemle (Social Review) in the early 1970s. 
On this see M6d Aladimd, ‘Our Age and the Working Class', Tdrsadalmi Szemle,
1970, No.6; Biaskovits Jin os, ‘On the Conception of the Working Class’, Tdrsadalmi 
Szemle, 1970, Nos.8-9; Halasi Liszl<5, ‘Meditation on Productive and Non-Productive 
Work’, Tdrsadalmi Szemle, 1970, Nos.8-9; Illes Jinos, ‘Some Problems on the Inner 
Stratification of the Hungarian Working Class', Tdrsadalmi Szemle, 1970, N o.ll; 
Kovacs Ferenc, ‘... Is this that Working Class?' Tdrsadalmi Szemle, 1971, No.2; M6d 
Aladimi, ‘Once Again: The Working Class Today’, Tdrsadalmi Szemle, 1971, No.4; 
Editorial Staff, ‘To the Margin of the Working Class Discussion', Tdrsadalmi Szemle,
1971, No.6.
2. P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976).
3. Janossy Ferenc, ‘Egy Evolucios Altemativa’ (One Evolutionary Alternative), 
Valdsdg, 1982, No.2.
4. B£lley Lisz 16, 'Tulajdonviszony 6s Tirsadalmi Struktura' (Property Relation and 
Social Structure), Tdrsadalmi Szemle, 1971, No.6, p.91.
5. The most important system-typical principles of social integration based on the 
primacy of the political system and the power system are:
1. the communist party is the centre of the power mechanism; state bodies are only the 
executant of tasks;
2. the monopolistic tendency prevails in the power organization;
3. there is maximum centralization of decisions;
4. the economic and political administration is considerably swollen;
5. there is organizational concentration;
6. organizational functions interpenetrate;
7. the structure of power is based on personal dependence within the organization;
8. functions develop a ‘seizure’ character: everyone has as much authority at his 
disposal as he can seize.
On this see Bihari Mihily, Poliiikai Mechanizmus is  Demokrdcia (Political Mechanism 
and Democracy) (Budapest: Kossuth K£>nyvkiad6, 1982), pp.282-5.
6. Mityis Rikosi, A Magyar Jovdirt (For the Hungarian Future) (Budapest: Szikra 
Kiatlis, 1947), p.373.
7. Bakcsi Gyftrgy, ‘Forradatmak, Hiboruk, Irodalom’ (Revolutions, Wars, Literature), 
Orosz is  Szovjet Irodalom 1890~tdl Napjainkig (Russian and Soviet Literature from 
1890 to o u t  days) (Budapest: Gondolat Kiad6, 1976), pp.324-5. The quotation 
illustrates well the literature of early socialism: through the varnishing and schematism 
the same black and white dichotomy appears as in political thinking, since the 
contemporary literature did not have any (declared) function other than the service and 
justification of daily politics.
8. Mityis Rakosi, ‘Az Allami & Munkafcgyelemrtil’ (On the State and Work Dis­
cipline), Report on the Meeting of the Central Committee, 30 Nov. 1951. A Szocialista 
Magyarorszdgirt (For Socialist Hungary) (Budapest: Szikra, 1955), p.55.
9. Em6 Gera, ‘A Magyar N6pgazdasig Fejleszt6s£nek Legktizelebbi Feladatai' (Next 
Tasks of the Development of the Hungarian People’s Economy), Report on the
WORKERS’ BEHAVIOUR AND INTERESTS IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY 189
Meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) 
held on 31 May 1930, published by the Agitation and Propaganda Sectionof the Central 
Committee of the HSWP, (Budapest, 1950), p .ll .
10. The frequent work stoppages in the United States during the Second World War 
constituted a most effective denial of the simplistic explanation — namely the ideo­
logical subversion of other political systems — for the various forms of worker resis­
tance: see J,W, Kuhn, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement: The Power of Industrial 
Work Groups (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 165,
11. Kiroly Fazekas, Lack c f Performance and Piece-Rate System Waging in the Enterprise 
Economy (doctoral dissertation, Karl Mans University of Economics, Budapest, 
1980). I deal with the role and effect of the Stakhanovite movement on motivation in the 
1950s in my book, A Taylorizmustol a Munkdsszervezeti Reformokig (From Taylorism 
to Work Organizational Reforms) (Budapest Akademiai Kiad6, in press),
12. H. Behrend, ‘Financial Incentives as the Expression of a System of Beliefs’, The British 
Journal o f Sociology (1959), p.147.
13. See, for example, Lajos Hethy and Csaba Mak6, A Munkdsmagalartdsok is a 
Gazdasdgi Szervezet (Worker Behaviour and the Economic Organization) (Budapest: 
Akaddmiai Kiad6, 1972); and H. David and C. Bernier, ‘Le salaire au rendement’, 
Institut de Recherche Appliquie sur le Travail (Montreal), 1977, No.8.
14. Staff Composition, Wage and Income Conditions o f Employees in State-Owned 
Industry, No.9 (Budapest: Central Statistical Office, 1981), pp.29-30.
15. Tibor lluszir, Fejezetek a MunkacrkOlcs TBrtdnetdbOl’ (Chapters from the History of 
Work Morale), Valdsdg, 1976, No.8.
16. Such cases are cited from the 1950-52 volumes of the one-time Goldberger factory 
newspaper Henger (Roller) by Gyiirgy Moldova in his report book, A Szent Tehin (The 
Holy Cow) (Budapest: MagveUS Kiad6, 1980), pp.164—9.
17. Ai MSZMP X. Kongresszusdnak Jegyidkdnyve (the Protocol of the Tenth Congress of 
the HSWP) (Budapest: Kossuth K6nyvkiad<5, 1971), p.94; and Az MSZMP XI, 
Kongresszusanak Jegyzdkdnyve (the Protocol of the Eleventh Congress of the HSWP) 
(Budapest: Kossuth Ktfnyvkiadd, 1975), p.465.
18. Imre Pozsgai, Demokrdcia is Kultura (Democracy and Cutlure) (Budapest: Kossuth 
Kiinyvkiad6, 1980), p.74.
19. Istvin Benke, £rdek is  Osztonzis (Interest and Incitement) (Budapest: Kossuth 
K<5nyvkiad6, 1975); Jozsef Lick, £rdek is  Tevikenvsig (Interest and Activity) (Buda­
pest: Kossuth KOnyvkiadd, 1979).
20. We deal in detail with the conception of interest and its objective nature in Lajos Hethy 
and Csaba Mak6, Munkdsok, irdekek, Brdekegyeztetis (Workers, Interests, Interest 
Harmonization) (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadti, 1978), pp.107-16, 215-17.
21. In spite of the reference to the motives of human behaviour beyond interests, we should 
like to emphasize that this study deals with the development and role of the social 
capacity of interest realization -  that is, it undertakes the description of one of the basic 
sociological components of human action. On the one hand, the individual is the 
subject of psychological analyses, while on the other hand, the types of individual 
reactions are the subject of social-psychological analyses.
22. Kiroly Fazekas, op. ciL, pp.l 18-19,
23. See Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1961); 
and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1956).
24. ‘Industrial relations* connotes that system of relations regulating, partly in institu­
tionalized form, the connections between participants in a work process — state, 
employer, employees and their organizations — as well as the processes making possible 
the solution of interest and power conflicts occurring in the economy of a given social 
system.
